Just a few months before the Declaration of Independence, last minute efforts were made to reconcile Britain and the American colonies. Dr Robin Eagles shows how former Prime Minister, the duke of Grafton, one of the most earnest advocates for finding a way out of the crisis, also took the opportunity of proposing a deal to halt hostilities to correct the official record of remarks made in a previous debate.

On 14 March 1776, which was noted by the Annual Register as ‘one of the most important [days] in the English history’, the duke of Grafton scrambled to his feet in the House of Lords to propose a last-minute effort to achieve conciliation with America. Throughout the crisis Grafton had trodden a middle way, even though he had been deeply involved with the measures in the 1760s that had prompted the breakdown in relations, including being Prime Minister from 1768 to 1770. He was in office once more under Lord North as lord privy seal (1771-1775) as divisions between Britain and America ended in open conflict. He had, however, resigned the privy seal six months previously, which left him free now to follow his own lights and press for all-out war to be avoided.

Before proceeding with the matter in hand, Grafton was keen to correct the record on an earlier intervention he had made during the debates of 5 March on the duke of Richmond’s motion for an address to ‘countermand the march of the German troops’, following the recent treaties with Brunswick, Hesse Cassel and Hanau. Or, rather, Grafton wished to confirm his own utterances as correct and offer one of the other former ministers the opportunity of correcting what he had told the House on that occasion.

Grafton had entered the 5 March debate late in proceedings, responding to a brief intervention by Viscount Weymouth, who had pointed out to the Lords that both Grafton and Lord Camden (the last lord to speak) had been in government when the Townshend Duties were passed and that he found it ‘somewhat extraordinary that they should now complain of their acts’. This had prompted Grafton to respond by offering the House a detailed explanation of his actions at the time, his concerns about the likelihood of them making matters worse, and how having seen the effect they had produced on America he had moved in cabinet in 1769 for complete repeal, but that he had been out-voted ‘if I recollect right’ by just one voice. This had meant that while most of the controversial duties had been scrapped, that on tea had been retained, leading ultimately to the 1773 Boston Tea Party.

In asserting this, Grafton had been contradicted by Weymouth, who insisted that ‘there was no majority, or casting voice; the numbers were equal’. Weymouth had then criticized Camden’s intervention before the debate wound up and Richmond’s motion was voted down by a healthy government majority. The debate had taken place in the Lords late into the night, and Grafton explained to the House that he had spoken at the time from memory and that although he was very sure that he was correct in his recollection of what had happened in cabinet, he had chosen not to answer Weymouth immediately, being ‘uneasy till I had enquired further into the circumstances of that important transaction’.

Grafton was now able to confirm that he had found among his papers a note sent to him by Lord Hillsborough, the then secretary of state for America, confirming that the numbers in cabinet when it was agreed to retain the duty on tea had not been equal and that Grafton had indeed been over-ruled:

‘which, as I then foresaw, would be productive of the worst consequences; and which now is the occasion of the present unhappy disputes, that threaten to overwhelm this country in ruin and destruction.’ [Cobbett, xviii. 1248]

Grafton sought now to clarify the matter, ‘lest any of you should think that I had either negligently asserted, or designedly misrepresented it’. He then invited Weymouth to rise and contradict him once more, if he still disagreed with the account he had presented. Strikingly, Weymouth stayed in his place, thereby presumably conceding the point, and when he did get to his feet to contribute to the debate later on, he made no reference to the details Grafton had laid before the House.

The substantive matter of the debate of 14 March was Grafton’s motion for conciliation, formed, as he insisted ‘on the principles of humanity, equity, and sound policy’. As he noted in his Autobiography, Grafton was especially alarmed by the use of the phrase ‘unconditional submission’ directed at the Americans, which he considered was ‘destructive of every hope, and rendered all reconciliation impracticable’. [Autobiography, 283] He trusted the proposal would open the door to an amicable resolution of differences ‘founded in reciprocal affection, and cemented by mutual interest’. To achieve this, he moved an address to the king requesting that if the Americans would present the British commander in chief with a petition setting out their grievances, that the king would agree to a suspension of arms and would have Parliament’s authority to assure the colonists that their petition would be ‘received, considered, and answered’.  [Cobbett, xviii. 1253-4]

Grafton’s motion attracted significant speeches from at least a dozen lords on both sides of the question. Focus was placed, once again, on accurate recording of what had been said, this time over a statement made by the earl of Dartmouth (Lord North’s stepbrother). Grafton attracted support for his motion from the duke of Manchester, concerned that Britain’s armed forces were in no fit state to undertake the duties asked of them, and the bishop of Peterborough, fearful that the government had backed itself into a corner such that ‘slaughter and devastation must now necessarily be the only means employed to re-establish mutual confidence, and a cordial reconciliation’. [Cobbett, xviii. 1275]

In spite of such interventions, the ministry was still able to rely on what Grafton referred to as ‘ingenious’ speeches to make its case and the thumping government majority was shown clearly enough by the eventual division, which resulted in just 28 lords (holding three proxies) backing Grafton’s proposal, against 71 (holding a further 20 proxies) holding firm to the administration. As was the case on several previous occasions, and would continue to be so over the coming years, another opportunity for averting war had been lost.

RDEE

Further reading:

Cobbett, Parliamentary History, vol. xviii

Duke of Grafton, Autobiography and political correspondence…, ed. Sir W. Anson (1898)